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Deriving Empirical Definitions of Spatial Labor Markets:  The Roles of Competing
Versus Complementary Growth
I. Introduction
All fifty states have publicly sponsored economic development efforts designed to
attract new firms to the state.  In principle, each state competes with 49 others in
attracting new jobs.  Similarly, individual communities through Chambers of Commerce or
local economic development agencies, attempt to attract new firms, sometimes competing
with other communities in the same state.  However, it is not clear that all economic gains
in one community come at the expense of potential gains in other communities.  In
particular, if one town succeeds in attracting new jobs, municipalities within commuting
distance may benefit rather than be harmed by the first community's good fortune.
This study defines the extent of a labor market using evidence of spillover benefits
from wage growth or job growth in other counties.  The study makes use of a simple
utility model, explaining individual residence decisions as a response to factors affecting
individual income.  If economic growth elsewhere raises the individual's earning prospects
relative to those in the present location, then the individual will move.  On the other hand,
if the individual can exploit the economic growth elsewhere by commuting, he will not
need to move to profit from the expansion.  Aggregating this individual-based model to
the county level, we show that county population will rise whenever economic expansion
occurs in the own county or in counties within commuting distance.  On the other hand,
economic growth outside the commuting range will lower local population growth.
The model is tested using county-level data from eight states in the Midwest over
the period 1969-1994.  All necessary data are available from electronic data files made
2available by the Bureau of Economic Analysis.  County population is explained by county
wage growth, wage growth in adjacent and nonadjacent counties, and national wage
growth.  The specification is repeated using information on job growth and on wage bill
growth (wages times jobs).  Empirical estimates correct for possible simultaneous
determination of local economic growth measures and local population.
The results are quite consistent, regardless of how economic growth is measured.
Local county population responds positively to own-county economic growth, economic
growth in the adjacent county, and even economic growth two counties away.  The
magnitude of the effect decreases as distance from the county increases.  On the other
hand, economic growth beyond two counties distance lowers population, presumably
because change of residence is required if the local population is to benefit from distant
economic growth.  The pattern of results differs depending upon the size of the county.  In
particular, if economic growth is uniform across all counties in the Midwest, the least
populous counties will lose population while the most populous counties will get larger.
These results suggest that the relevant labor market for a county includes
communities within a two-county radius.  Presumably, then, it is wasteful for economic
development efforts to attempt to compete with other communities within this area.
Instead, cooperative efforts to attract a business to the area would still insure at least
partial benefit to all counties in the region, regardless of which county the firm selects.
3II. A Model of Population Growth
Our approach to these questions uses a simple utility based model of individual
locational decisions.  The underlying assumption is that the individuals get utility from
wages and job prospects.  Consequently, they decide where to live based on a comparison
of the relative economic benefits of living in alternative counties.  If economic growth
elsewhere raises an individual’s earning prospects sufficiently relative to those in the
present location, then the individual will move.  On the other hand, if the individual can
exploit the economic growth elsewhere by commuting, then the individual will not need to
move to profit from the expansion.  Aggregating this individual-based model to the county
level, we show that county population will rise whenever economic expansion occurs in
the own county or in counties within commuting distance.  On the other hand, economic
growth outside commuting range will lower local population growth.
At any given time t, an individual living in county 0 has three options regarding
work and location: work in the local county receiving wage W0,t and incur no commuting
cost; work in another county, k, and absorb commuting costs Ck,t in exchange for
receiving wages Wk,t; or move to a separate labor market, m, for wages Wm,t and absorb
moving costs Mm,t.
We define the indirect utility of an individual living in county 0 as a function of the
average wage in county 0, and of the wage of counties within commuting distance net of
commuting costs.  This can be specified as U0,t (W0,t, Wk,t - Ck,t), where W0,t is the average
wage per job in county 0 at time t, and Wk,t-Ck,t is a vector of wages minus the commuting
costs for counties within commuting distance, k=1,...,K.  Similarly, for an individual living
in county 0, the utility associated with residing in another county m outside commuting
4distance can be expressed as Um,t(Wm,t,Mm,t) where Wm,t is the prevailing market wage, and
Mm,t is the cost of moving from county 0 to county m.
At time t, an individual will want to maximize utility by deciding where to locate
based on a comparison of utilities across all counties, Ui,t, i=0,...N.  This decision is
written as
(1)  U = Max (U0,t, U1,t,...,UN,t)
where Ui,t is the utility for county i, and N is the number of counties.  Consequently, the
utility of an individual in any county can be expressed as a function of all county wage
levels and on the moving and commuting costs between counties,1
(2)  U = Max (U0,t, U1,t,...,UN,t) = U(W0,t, W1,t,...WN,t,C1,t,...CN,t, Ml,t,...MN,t).
Suppose an individual initially resides in county 0.  Equation (2) implies that at any time t,
an individual will live in county n if conditions change so that Max (U0,t, U1,t,...UN,t)= Un,t.
Thus, Pj,t, the population level in county j at time t, can be expressed as a function of the
utility levels across all counties, which are in turn a function of the wages, commuting and
moving costs for all counties considered.  In notation,
(3)  Pj,t = G[U0,t,...,UN,t] = G[W0,t, W1,t,...WN,t,C1,t,...CN,t, Ml,t,...MN,]
To make (3) tractable empirically, we need to specify functional forms for G and
Uj,t.  Assuming a Cobb-Douglas form for Uj,t,, the utility functions will be
(4)  Uj,t[W0,t, W1,t,...WN,t,C1,t,...CN,t, Ml,t,...MN] = 
i
N
=
∏
0
Wi,tαi  *Mi,tβi*Ctδi;
                                                       
1
 Later we will substitute local jobs and local income for local wages in our utility function.  For the most
part, our results are quite similar regardless of how the strength of the local labor markets is measured.
5where αi are the relatives weights on wages, βi are the relative weights on migration costs,
and δi are the relative weights of commuting costs in the utility function.  We assume that
G[.] in equation (3) is proportional to the level of utility, so that
 (5)  Pj,t= γUj,t[W0,t, W1,t,...WN,t,C1,t,...CN,t, Ml,t,...MN] = γ
i
N
=
∏
0
 Wi,tαi  *Mi,tβi*Ci,tδi;
where γ is a constant of proportionality.
 The values of αi determine how the population responds to relative wages in the
own county and elsewhere.  The signs of αi indicate whether wages in a county raise or
lower utility in the own county relative to utility elsewhere.  We expect wages in the own
county will raise U0,t, holding other county wages constant, so that α0>0.  If wages in
another county j raise utility in the own county, αj>0.  If wages in county j raise utility
elsewhere relative to the own county, αj<0.  Therefore the signs on αj for adjacent and
non adjacent counties are relevant for understanding linkages between counties in terms of
complementary versus competing growth effects.  The only way Wj can increase U0,t
relative to utility elsewhere is if workers living in the own county can commute to county
j. Therefore, a positive value of αj implies the existence of complementary growth
between counties.  In other words, counties 0 and j are in the same spatial labor market. A
negative coefficient indicates the presence of competing growth between counties.  We
interpret a negative coefficient as an indication that workers in the own county would have
to migrate in order to benefit from wages in county j.
Our interest is to examine the relationship between the growth rate of a county’s
population and the economic growth rate of its surrounding area.  Taking natural
6logarithms of (5) we get
lnPj,t=lnγ+α0lnW0,t+α1lnW1,t+...+αNlnWN,t+[β1lnM1,t+...+βNlnMN,t+δ1lnC1,t+...+δNlnCN,t].
To get a population growth rate, we take the difference between time t and t+k, so that
(6)  ln[Pj,t+k/Pj,t] = lnγ +
i
N
=
∑
0
αi ln [Wi,t+k/Wi,t] + 
i
N
=
∑
0
βiln[Mi,t+k/Mi,t] +
i
N
=
∑
0
δiln[Ci,t+k/Ci,t]
At any point in time, migration costs and commuting costs will differ across counties.
However, the rate of change of these costs will primarily reflect changes in transportation
equipment and fuel costs that are common across counties.  Therefore, we assume
ln[Mi,t+k/Mi,t]= αM+ej,tM and ln[Ci,t+k/Ci,t]=αC+ej,tC.  We assume that the idiosyncratic
commuting and migration costs are uncorrelated with the average wages.  Then,
(7)  ln[Pj,t+k/Pj,t] = α + α0ln[W0,t+k/W0,t] + α1ln[W1,t+k/W1,t] + ...+αNln[WN,t+k/WN,t]+ ej,t
where
 α=(αM+αC)N is a constant and ej,t= ej,tM+ ej,tC is a random error term.
Empirical Strategies
The equation we estimate is
(8)  ln[Pj,t+k/Pj,t]=α+α0ln[W0,t+k/W0,t]+α1ln[W1,t+k/W1,t]+α2ln[W2,t+k/W2,t]
+αN ln[WN,t+k/WN,t] + ej,t
where the values ln[Pj,t+k/Pj,t] and ln[W0,t+k/W0,t] are observed for county j, ln[W1,t+k/W1,t] is
for an adjacent county (one county away from j), ln[W2,t+k/W2,t] is for a non-adjacent
county (two counties away from j), and ln[WN,t+k/WN,t] aggregates the effect of the rest of
the states into an observation on the national average.
A cause for concern is the likely simultaneity between population growth and wage
growth in the same county.  Many papers document the existence of simultaneity, using a
variety of instruments to identify the causal relationship (Greenwood, 1986; Clark, 1996).
7We selected instruments based on a local labor market model which assumes lagged
adjustments to equilibrium wages and employment.  These adjustments are illustrated in
Figure 1.  Demand and supply are defined in per population terms.  The proportion of the
population supplying labor is upward sloping in the wage, while the proportion firms want
to hire is a downward sloping function of the wage.  It is possible that per capita labor
demand varies with population if there are agglomeration economies, so we index demand
by population.  The employment rate is defined as Et/Pt where Et is the employment level
at time t, and Pt is the population.  The employment rate varies between zero and one.
Given prevailing demand and supply conditions for labor, Et/Pt reaches a maximum
possible value, Ete/Pt, when the wage is at equilibrium, Wte.  Any departure from
equilibrium will result in a lower value for Et/Pt, regardless of whether the wage is above
or below equilibrium.
Suppose that the employment rate is given by E1t/Pt in Figure 1.  If the wage is Wt0
so that we have excess supply of labor, there will be downward pressure on future wages.
If the wage is Wt1 there is excess demand for labor so that wages will rise in the future.
As a consequence, holding constant Et/Pt, the higher is Wt, the lower will be Wt+1 if the
market tends toward equilibrium.  Because low levels of Et/Pt imply a departure from
equilibrium employment regardless of whether the wage is above or below equilibrium, we
cannot predict the effect of Et/Pt on future wages.  On the other hand, we know that low
Et/Pt implies that employment will rise as the market adjusts toward equilibrium.
Therefore, we would expect low values of Et/Pt to signal higher values of Et+1/Pt+1.  As is
clear from Figure 1, there is no unique relationship between Wt and Et+1/Pt+1.  Both wages
8that are above equilibrium (Wt0) and wages that are below equilibrium (Wt1) would imply
an increase in future employment as the labor market adjusts toward equilibrium.
This simple sticky wage model of local labor markets suggests that one can
forecast future wage and employment growth in a county using information on wages and
employment rates in the current period.  Implicitly, this formulation assumes that wages
are in real terms, so we should add a control for price differences in living costs in the base
period.  We settled on the following empirical formulation.
(9)  ln[W0,t+k/W0,t] = a + a1ln[W0,t] + a2ln[Et/Pt] + a3ln[Pt] + a4ln[Pt]2 + a5URBAN+et.
where ln[W0,t] is the log of the average wage at time t, and ln[Et/Pt] is the log of the
employment rate, calculated as the number employed in the county divided by population.
ln[Pt] and ln[Pt]2 are the log of the population level and its square, included to fix the level
of demand per capita in the base period.  URBAN is an urban dummy, equal to one if the
county was an urban center, or adjacent to an urban center in 1969.  A county was
considered an urban center if it had a population above 50,000 in 1969.  This is included
to help control for differences in living costs between urban and rural markets. We expect
the coefficient on ln[W0,t] to be negative.  The coefficient on URBAN should be positive if
wages in urban areas are higher in part because of higher living costs.2  The other
coefficients cannot be signed a priori.
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 In equation (9), wages are deflated by the consumer price index.  However, relative cost of living may
vary across urban and rural markets.  Let PU be the relative cost of living in an urban market when living
costs in a rural market are normalized to one.  We expect PU > 1 if it is more expensive to live in the
urban market.  Then for a given wage level W0,t, the base real wage effect on wage growth will be a1 ln
(W0,t/PU) = a1 ln (W0,t) - a1ln (PU) for the urban market and a1 ln (W0,t) for a rural market.  The coefficient
on the urban dummy variable will be -a1 ln (PU).  Theory suggests a1 < 0, so if PU > 1, -a1 ln (PU) > 0.
9To determine whether county population growth is affected by the wage growth
outside its borders, we need to measure wage growth in the surrounding counties. From
each group of adjacent and non-adjacent counties, we identified the county with the
highest population in 1969, the first year for which we had data.  It was assumed that
these largest counties would have the most significant impact on utility in the own county
because of better information on jobs and wages in the larger labor markets.  Thus, wage
growth one county away is measured by the wage growth in the largest adjacent county
and wage growth two counties away is measured by wage growth in the largest county
two counties away.
We estimated equations (8) and (9) simultaneously, using three stage least squares.
Our sample includes all counties regardless of initial size.  It is possible that the response
of population growth to own wage growth or wage growth elsewhere differs between
large and small counties.  Therefore, we also estimate the model over subsamples of
counties defined by the lowest quartile, the middle quartiles and the upper quartile of
population in 1969.
III. Data
The data used are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, from the years 1969 to
1994.  The states included in the sample are Iowa, Kansas, South Dakota, Nebraska,
Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Missouri.  These states were chosen because a
significant portion of each state was rural, and a significant proportion of the population
resided in nonrural, nonmetropolitan locations.  This assures us of considerable variation
in county population.  In addition, counties were of comparable size across states and
were arranged in a similar grid pattern.  Comparable size makes it more sensible to assume
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equal growth in migration and commuting costs.  Comparable grid patterns make it more
sensible to assume equal population supply responses to economic growth one or two
counties away.  There were a total of 737 counties, of which 277 were determined as
urban by our earlier criteria.
We divide the time period into five subperiods of five years each.  The base
periods were 1969, 1974, 1979, 1984, and 1989.  The growth rates for population and
average wage per job were measured over five year intervals: 69-74, 74-79, 79-84, 84-89,
and 89-94. This yielded five time periods for every state, bringing the total number of
observations to 3685.  A five year period should provide a sufficiently long time to capture
the long run population response to changes in local and surrounding labor markets.  It
also sidesteps potential complications due to short term common cyclical shocks which
could exaggerate the positive correlation between local wages and employment.3
 Population is defined as the total number of people living in the county.  Wage per
job is the wage and salary earnings per person working in the county. It is important to
emphasize the distinction between the measures of population and wage.  County
population includes those living in the county, but not necessarily working in the county.
Wage and employment data are from all people working in the county including those who
commute to the county but live elsewhere, and excluding those who live in the county but
work elsewhere.  In this way, we are able to divorce labor market variables from
population responses.
                                                       
3
 The average recession lasted less than one year over this period, so five year growth rates should not
reflect short-term macroeconomic fluctuations.
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IV.  Population Growth from Spatially Differentiated Wage Growth
 The results of the system estimation of equation (8) and (9) are presented in Table
1.4  The system explains only 5 percent of the variation in population and wage growth.
The coefficients in the population growth equation are interpretable alternatively as
elasticities of utility with respect to wage levels, or as elasticities of population growth
with respect to wage growth in each area.  A 10 percent increase in the local county wage
growth results in a 5.9 percent increase in population growth.  As one would expect,
increased wage growth in a county raises the utility from residence in that county and
attracts migrants.  The coefficients α1 and α2 indicate how wage growth rates in the
adjacent and non adjacent counties affect population growth in the own county.  The
positive α1 indicates complementary growth effects between adjacent counties, but the
coefficient is very small and is not precisely estimated.  Wage growth in the adjacent
county raises home county utility by only a fraction of the home county wage effect.  In
contrast, α2 is negative and statistically significant.  Taken literally, 10 percent wage
growth two counties away lowers utility in the home county by 1.2 percent.  These results
suggest that the relevant county labor market as defined by population responses to
spatially differentiated wage growth includes the home county and perhaps the adjacent
counties.  Wage growth outside that range lowers home county population, consistent
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 Estimates that do not correct for simultaneity between local wages and local population growth yielded
similar qualitative results but exaggerated the effect of local wages on local population growth.
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with the presumption that wage growth outside the local labor market raises utility
elsewhere relative to home county utility, and thus causes outmigration.5
Despite the weak fit, the results from the instrumenting equation are consistent
with the local labor market model outlined above.  As required by the theory, holding the
employment rate constant, higher wage levels cause wages to decrease in subsequent
years.  The coefficient on the URBAN dummy variable is positive, consistent with the
impact of presumed higher urban living costs on wage growth.
When the sample is broken down by size of county population, we find that the
size of the local labor market varies with population size.  For the smaller counties, only
local wage growth appears to raise population growth.  For the largest counties, wage
growth in the adjacent county also causes home county population to increase.  Home
county wage growth causes relatively inelastic population response in the smallest
counties, but the population elasticity with respect to own county wages increases as
county size increases.  At the same time, wage growth outside the county has the greatest
negative effect on the smallest counties.6
Common wage shocks across all markets might be expected to leave local population
unchanged.  However, if demand for local amenities varies with income, it is possible that
wage changes would not be neutral.  Consequently, equiproportional changes across all areas
may cause the population to grow, decline or remain unchanged.  The impact of such an
equiproportional wage shock is the sum of the population elasticities, α0+α1+α2+αN.  The
                                                       
5
 We also estimated the model adding wage growth for the state, purged of the effects of the own, adjacent
and nonadjacent counties.  The coefficient on this variable was also negative but very small and
insignificant.
6
 The positive effect of national wage growth on population in the largest counties is a puzzle that is
repeated when we examine the effect of external job growth on home county population growth.
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summed effects are presented in Table 1 as the test of wage neutrality.  In each case, we reject
the null hypothesis that uniform wage growth has no effect on the population growth.
Overall, uniform wage increases across all regions raise population in these states.  However,
the positive effect is limited to the counties in the middle and upper-size quartiles.  The
smallest counties get even smaller as wages rise in all markets.
These apparent differences in population elasticities between counties of different
size could be due to the imprecision of the estimates for the smallest counties.  To test this
we imposed the restriction of equality of coefficients on wage growth across small, middle
and large counties.  This amounts to imposing equal values of α0, α1, α2, and αN  across
the three subsamples, a total of eight restrictions on parameters.  This test of structural
equivalence leads to rejection of the null hypothesis of equal population growth responses
to wage growth across counties of different size.
V. Alternative Measures of Economic Growth
Having investigated the relationship between population growth and wage growth,
we consider alternative measures of economic growth that may also raise home county
utility.  We employ separately the number of jobs and total labor income earned in a
county as variables that enter into the utility function.  As before, we use a model linking
population growth to job growth, and income growth.  Jobs are measured as the number
of wage and salary jobs in the county.  Income is measured as the total wage and salary
earnings for the people working in the county.
Population Growth from Spatially Differentiated Job Growth
The results of the joint estimation of equations (8) and (9) using job growth as the
explanatory variable are presented in Table 2.  The model explains 18 percent of the
14
variation in population and job growth. The coefficients represent elasticities of population
growth to job growth in different areas. The results are puzzling, in that job growth is
complementary with local population growth, regardless of the location of job growth.7
Population growth does respond most strongly to job growth in the own county. A 10
percent increase in local county jobs raises population by 4.4 percent.  Although some of
the job growth is accommodated by people already in the county or within commuting
distance, nearly half of the job growth is filled by migrant job seekers from other counties.
Job growth in adjacent counties also benefits the home county.  The elasticity is about one
fourth the size of the home county wage growth effect.  Complementary growth effects
extend to non-adjacent counties and the national level as well.  The marginal utility of
external county job growth declines with distance, as the elasticities with respect to non-
adjacent and national job growth are roughly one-eighth of the home county effect.  While
the spillover benefits of more distant job growth are very small (a ten percent change in
nonadjacent or national job growth raises local population by less than one percent in five
years) the literal interpretation is that the relevant labor market includes adjacent and non-
adjacent counties as well as the national labor market.
The local labor market model once again performs as expected in generating
predictions of job growth.  The model predicted that, holding wages fixed, higher
employment rates in the base period would lead to slower future job growth.  This
prediction holds in the data.  No other predictions come from the theory except that the
sign on the base period wage should be opposite that on the urban dummy variable.  That
                                                       
7
 Job growth at the state level does decrease local population, so these results are sensitive to specification.
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expectation is also satisfied in the data.  All in all, the instrumenting equations in Tables 1
and 2 are quite consistent with the simple sticky-wage model of local labor markets.
When we break the sample down by population size, the results for the market
counties look more reasonable.  The pattern of growth complementarities suggest that
adjacent and nonadjacent counties raise local population, but that job growth outside that
area lowers local population.  Results for the larger counties are more similar to those of
the full sample, with no clear geographic delimitation on the size of the local labor
market.8
As before, we test for the structural equivalence of relationships between counties
and find that there are significant differences in the elasticities of job growth between
counties of different sizes.  The test of neutrality indicates that equiproportional growth
has a small positive and imprecisely estimated effect on the smallest counties.  The
population response to equiproportional job growth is much larger in the more populous
counties.
Population Growth from Spatially Differentiated Income Growth
The results of the system estimation of equations (8) and (9) using real aggregate
county income growth are presented in Table 3.  Real income, I W Jt t t0 0 0, , ,*=  is the
product of the average wage and number of jobs in a county.  Inserting real aggregate
income in place of real wages into the specification of equation (8) is equivalent to the
assumption that W0t and J0t have the same population elasticity α0.  The model explains 24
percent of the variation in population and aggregate income growth.  A 10 percent
                                                       
8
 State job growth lowered population in the larger counties, suggesting that the limits to the local labor
market might be at or beyond the nonadjacent county.
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increase in local county income increases population by 3.3 percent.  The magnitude of the
effect decreases with distance, but remains positive for counties within a two county
radius.
Estimating across subsets, we find patterns similar to the ones observed over the
entire sample.  For all three size groups, population responds positively to its own
aggregate income growth, and to aggregate income growth in adjacent and nonadjacent
counties.  Beyond the two county radius, income growth competes with local population
growth.  Local income growth is least effective in raising population in the smallest
counties, while national growth has the largest negative effect on the smallest counties.
Consequently, income growth is not neutral across counties.  Common wage shocks
across all counties lower population in the smallest counties and raise population
elsewhere.
VI Conclusion
This paper uses spatially differentiated economic growth measures to determine
the relationship between counties in terms of complementary or competing growth.  The
results strongly support the conclusion that there are complementary growth effects
between adjacent counties.  The implied extent of the local labor market is sensitive to
specification and county size.  However, the best performing model involving the use of
aggregate labor income as the measure of growth in the labor market yields very
consistent results.  The benefits of aggregate income growth in a county will spillover to
adjacent aggregate income and non-adjacent counties (two counties away).  These results
imply that the local labor market includes the home county and counties within a two
county radius.  Given the generally uniform structure and size of the counties in our study,
17
this result is consistent with studies that define the local labor market by a commuting time
of up to an hour one way. 9
We find that the largest counties have a structural advantage in attracting
migration when they experience economic growth.  When economic growth occurs
nationally, the outmigration rate is lowest for these counties.  The smallest counties benefit
less from their own growth, and lose more from growth occurring elsewhere.  When
economic growth occurs in all areas, the smallest counties shrink while the middle and
largest counties grow larger.
These results suggest that economic development strategies should be regionally
based.  By coordinating their efforts, counties can take advantage of the spillover benefits
that exist between counties.  In formulating policy for the smallest counties, it appears that
jobs are as important or more important than wages in stimulating population growth.
Therefore, it may be counterproductive to concentrate on creation of high wage jobs as
opposed to policies which encourage job growth more generally when designing
development policies for rural counties.
                                                       
9
 See So, Orazem, and Otto (1998).
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Table 1: Regressions of Population Growth on Spatially Differentiated Wage Growth
Variables Estimated Coefficients and t-Ratios
Entire
Sample
Lower
Quartile
Middle
Quartiles
Upper
Quartile
α0: ln[W0,t+5/W0,t] 0.588302*10(4.069)
0.269549
(1.898)
0.555513*
(2.753)
1.042711
(1.91)
α1: ln[W1,t+5/W1,t] 0.016484(1.027)
-0.027698
(-0.857)
0.009901
(0.466)
0.08388*
(2.943)
α2: ln[W2,t+5/W2,t] -0.124321*(-7.425)
-0.047876
(-1.2372)
-0.139034*
(-6.396)
-0.18881*
(-6.283)
αN: ln[WN,t+5/WN,t] -0.132911*(-3.002)
-0.6499*
(-7.205)
-0.254329*
(-4.369)
0.607358*
(7.69)
a1: ln[Pt] 0.022344*
(8.784)
0.010431
(0.735)
-0.093226*
(-1.965)
0.032015*
(2.996)
a2: ln[Pt]2 -0.001468*
(-3.875)
0.000471
(0.075)
0.022253*
(2.554)
-0.002545*
(-2.336)
a3: ln[Et/Pt] -0.034534*
(-8.122)
-0.047699*
(-4.514)
-0.033187*
(-5.907)
-0.040519*
(-6.781)
a4: ln[Wt] -0.027391*
(-5.084)
-0.024557
(-1.524)
-0.032688*
(-4.226)
-0.027993*
(-3.789)
a5: URBAN 0.009003*
(4.801)
0.00528
(0.543)
0.008501*
(3.004)
0.00546*
(2.00)
System R-Square 0.0532 0.0451 0.0501 0.0795
Test of Structural Equivalence 98.6949*
Test of Neutrality
Sum of Coefficients
3.6342
0.347554
6.0632*
-0.455925
0.4737
0.172051
3.963
1.545139
                                                       
10
 Significant at the .05 level.
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Table 2: Regressions of Population Growth on Spatially Differentiated Job Growth
Variables Estimated Coefficients and t-Ratios
Entire
Sample
Lower
Quartile
Middle
Quartiles
Upper
Quartile
α0: ln[J0,t+5/J0,t] 0.440613*(18.536)
0.16536*
(3.894)
0.346879*
(9.513)
0.51313*
(11.592)
α1: ln[J1,t+5/J1,t] 0.128651*(13.254)
0.096548*
(4.851)
0.130837*
(9.521)
0.075348*
(4.622)
α2: ln[J2,t+5/J2,t] 0.065624*(6.405)
0.071654*
(3.505)
0.068235*
(4.738)
-0.035902*
(-2.005)
αN: ln[JN,t+5/JN,t] 0.087189*(4.009)
-0.236076*
(-5.053)
0.084289*
(2.795)
0.384734*
(10.379)
a1: ln[Pt] 0.064769*
(13.546)
0.001145
(0.056)
0.036079
(0.401)
0.147043*
(6.339)
a2: ln[Pt]2 -0.00421*
(-6.031)
0.012271
(1.347)
0.008911
(0.539)
-0.012344*
(-5.491)
a3: ln[Et/Pt] -0.101399*
(-14.772)
-0.142226*
(-9.634)
-0.1103*
(-10.934)
-0.157873*
(-11.188)
a4: ln[Wt] -0.039057*
(-4.251)
0.018948
(0.0815)
-0.061769*
(-4.434)
-0.078366*
(-5.297)
a5: URBAN 0.009456*
(2.334)
-0.016934
(-1.202)
0.00245
(0.464)
0.008924
(1.303)
System R-Square 0.1774 0.0837 0.1455 0.2402
Test of Structural Equivalence 74.4692*
Test of Neutrality
Sum of Coefficients
434.978*
0.722077
2.6787
0.097486
174.1439*
0.63024
213.1258*
0.93731
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Table 3: Regressions of Population Growth on Spatially Differentiated Income Growth
Variables Estimated Coefficients and t-Ratios
Entire
Sample
Lower
Quartile
Middle
Quartiles
Upper
Quartile
α0: ln[I0,t+5/I0,t] 0.325776*(14.475)
0.131394*
(3.955)
0.259904*
(7.802)
0.442114*
(9.017)
α2:  ln[I1,t+5/I1,t] 0.170298*(23.597)
0.066693*
(4.526)
0.167671*
(17.091)
0.224918*
(17.96)
α3: ln[I2,t+5/I2,t] 0.122477*(16.01)
0.061012*
(3.962)
0.132102*
(12.513)
0.090954*
(6.921)
αN: ln[IN,t+5/IN,t] -0.289337*(-14.119)
-0.373977*
(-9.061)
-0.331947*
(-11.745)
-0.127721*
(-3.59)
a1: ln[Pt] 0.082703*
(13.804)
0.012904
(0.45)
0.009798
(0.089)
0.0176015*
(6.728)
a2: ln[Pt]2 -0.005744*
(-6.669)
0.011763
(0.924)
0.017753
(0.873)
-0.015366*
(-6.104)
a3: ln[Et/Pt] -0.120477*
(-13.142)
-0.185892*
(-8.962)
-0.13307*
(-10.002)
-0.176032*
(-9.505)
a4: ln[Wt] -0.048594*
(-4.232)
-0.004004
(-0.123)
-0.072424*
(-4.131)
-0.088195*
(-4.953)
a5: URBAN 0.014334*
(2.873)
-0.011942
(-0.607)
0.007799
(1.159)
0.004706
(0.615)
System R-Square 0.212 0.1144 0.1913 0.2539
Test of Structural Equivalence 136.9217*
Test of Neutrality
Sum of Coefficients
91.2987*
0.329214
4.8488
-0.114878
23.4221*
0.22773
64.895*
0.630265
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